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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3084 
___________ 
 
STEVEN WARREN WHELAN, 
                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TANDRA L. DAWSON, 
in her personal capacity 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No 3-16-cv-02948) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 3, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 19, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
On May 24, 2016, pro se appellant Steven Warren Whelan filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey challenging an order entered in 
his divorce proceedings.  Specifically, Whelan alleged that, on April 1, 2016, the 
Honorable Tandra L. Dawson, who is presiding over his divorce proceedings in New 
York Family Court, violated his constitutional rights by suspending a visitation order that 
permitted him to see his young daughter.  Whelan named Judge Dawson as the defendant 
in his federal action, and, by way of relief, asked the District Court to allow him “routine 
visits” with his daughter.  Whelan also submitted a motion seeking the same relief in 
conjunction with the complaint.   
 On June 28, 2016, following oral argument, the District Court dismissed the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied Whelan’s motion.  Whelan 
promptly filed an “emergency motion” for reconsideration, but, by order entered July 7, 
2016, the District Court denied relief.  Whelan timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s judgment under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1291.  We exercise plenary review over questions of subject matter jurisdiction.  
Lightfoot v. United States, 564 F.3d 625, 626 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Upon review, we agree with the District Court that it lacked jurisdiction over this 
action.  First, although it is not entirely clear from Whelan’s submissions whether the 
state-court order suspending his visitation rights was final, if it was, then the District 
Court was precluded from reviewing it under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that the 
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Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over 
actions in which the plaintiff is “complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court 
review and rejection of those judgments”).  Furthermore, to the extent that Whelan’s 
complaint can be construed as invoking the jurisdiction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain 
injunctive relief against Judge Dawson, the statute itself explicitly bars such relief.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an 
act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”); 
see also Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing “the impropriety of such suits where the judge acted as an adjudicator rather 
than an enforcer or administrator of a statute.”).  
 Accordingly, we will affirm.  
